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Economic Growth and Recovery in the United States: 19 19-1941
Alexander J. Field
. I NTRODUCTION
Th is chapter has two main sections and an appendix. The first section provides an overview of what lay behind record productivity growth in the US econom y between 1929 and 1941. The second considers the role of rigidities and other negative supply conditions in worsening the downturn and slowing recovery. W hile I argue consistently that the overarching explanation of the G reat Depression will and should continue to emphasize a collapse and slow revival of the growth of aggregate demand, I spend relatively little time o n what drives this since these issues are dealt with in detail elsewhere in the volume. The chapter instead concentrates on the aggregate suppl y side-both the broad array of positive shocks that I argue propelled potential and, eventuall y, actual output forward , and the negative conditions which, in interaction with aggregate demand, may have increased the size of the output ga p and prolonged its persistence. An appendix offers detail discussion and updated calculations of productivity growth rates for the critical period from 1929 to 1941.
.2 . GROWTH AND CYCLES
Econom ic growth and business cycles are two of macroeconomists' central concern s. In principle, this should be no less true in studies of th e Great Depression. Yet for perhaps understa ndable reasons, the preponderance of academ ic scholarship has focused on the persistent output gap and high unemployment that marked the I 930s. In other words, it has focused on cycles. This chapter examines the years 1929-4 1 in the United States with a foc us on the growth of actual and potenti al output during this period as well as the expansion and contraction of the output gap-the difference between act ual and potential.'
A princ ipal theme is that potential, and, eventuall y, ac tual o utpu t rose very rapidl y over th is 12 yea r peri od , a lmost enti rely as the conseq uence of the growth of tota l factor productivity.2 It was this growth that mad e possible the successful p rosecutio n o f the Second W o rld War as well as what Wa lt Rostow (l 960) call ed the age of hi gh mass consumption tha t fo ll owed . In o ther wo rds, I a rgue that the infrastructura l, orga n izati onal, and techno logical fou ndatio ns o f the golden age (1 948 -73) were already largely in place by 194 1. T hi s co ntrasts wit h the sta nda rd na rrative which suggests th at th e war somehow magicall y transfo rmed the d oo m and gloom of the Depression yea rs, so that, like a phoenix rising fro m th e ashes, th e US suddenl y, in 1948, stands a colossus as trid e the worl d econom y. G iven th at th e U n ited States was involved in th e wa r fo r less th an four yea rs, with fu ll scale war mobil izatio n lasti ng perhaps sixteen mo nth s, th is narrative wa rran ts re-examination .
T he Dep ress io n yea rs were d isastrous fro m the standpo int o f capacity utilizat io n, a nd I do not m ean to d ownplay any of thi s. Ban k fai lures and fi nancial crisis we re associated with a n 87 per cent decline in real gross p ri va te do mes ti c in ves tm ent between 1929 and l 932. Co nstructi o n spending never recove red fro m its 1920s peaks un til after th e wa r. 1929 ve h icle prod uctio n was not rea ttained unti l 1949. T he Dow Jo nes Ind ustrial Ind ex d ro pped 89 per cent from its August 1929 peak to its tro ugh in July of 1932, with man y of th e twen tieth cen tury's largest o ne d ay increases occurrin g durin g th at volati le a nd sicken ing slide. Rea l GD P decl ined mo re th an 27 per cen t and unemployment rose from 3.2 per cent in 1929 to 25 per cent in 193 3, wh ile consu m p ti o n decl in ed 18 per cent in rea l term s. Double di git u nem ploym en t fo r mo re than a decade rep resen ted a terrible waste of h u ma n and o th er resources, a nd untold ha rdsh ip fo r th e milli o ns o f people out o f work.
3 And yet the Depression yea rs we re also a trium p h o f Ameri ca n ingenuity, inve ntive ness, an d hard work. Fuelled by an expl osio n o f resea rch and development, go vern m ent infrast ru cture investmen t, and crea tive respo nse lo adve rsity, scientific, techn o logical, and o rga n izatio nal adva nce expand ed the capabiliti esan accelerat io n of the infl ation rate ensues. Ge nerally speaki ng, wh e n one is below po tential , th at is, in the presence of a n outp ut gap, a n in crease in no min al in co m e wi ll result mostl y in inc reases in output and c111ploym ent. As a n econo m y approaches potenti al fro 111 below, addit iona l stimu lus begi ns to be experienced as pri ce in creases rather tha n o utput growth . Wi th labour a nd phys ica l capi tal now in sho rt su p pl)', infl at io n accelera tes a nd, in th e face of furth er in crease in aggregate dc111and , growt h in outpu t a nd em plo)'ment will stall.
2 Tota l facto r prod uct ivity (T FP ) is th e rati o of o utput to a co111b in ed m easure of ca pital and labo u r inpu t. Labour produ ctivity, in cont rast, is th e ra tio of ou tput to t he n u111 bc r of wo rke rs o r worker hours. The growt h ofTFP is th e difference between th e growth of o utp ut an d a weigh ted average of the gnl\\1h of inpu ts, with t he weights correspondi ng to t he shares of the two fact o rs in nati o nal income. Fo r the Depress ion years, t he p recise weigh ts do n' t mat ter m uch , beca use nei ther labo ur no r pri vate secto r physical capi tal inputs grew noticeably betwee n 1929 and 194 1. Thu s, all of th e substa ntial outpu t gro\\1h betwee n these years ca n be attribu ted to a n inc rease in tota l fa ctor producti vity . Fo r d etai ls, sec Field (20 11 : introd uctio n a nd appe ndix ), as wel l as the appendix to thi s chapter.
1 Investment, co nsumpt io n, a nd o ut put data arc from < h tt p://www. bea.gov> . Natio nal ln co111e
and Produ ct Accounts, T able 1.1.3, accessed 22 Ja n ua ry 2012. T he un employm ent dat a arc fro m Lebcrgott ( I 964). Co nst ruct io n data a rc from Carter ct al , (2006) (Field, 20 11 ) helped the United States win th e war and set the stage fo r a quarter century of post-war prosperity. It is part of th e expla nation, alo ng with wartime destruction in other countri es, for why the US loomed so large in the wo rld eco nomy in 1948, and hi gh post-war growth rates in Europe and Japan rep resented, in part, catch up lo a fronl"ier that had been pushed out in the Un ited Stales during th e 1930s (Abra movitz, 1986) .
Thi s expa nsion in potential and , when demand co nditi o ns permitted, actual outpu t was fuelled by severa l tributaries. The first was th e maturing of a private ly fund ed research and development syste m th at had begun with Thomas Ed iso n in Men lo Park, New Jersey. Then, as now, most pri va te sector R&D was conducted in manufacturing, and we have good data on activity in thi s secto r because of surveys conducted by the Na tional Resea rch Coun cil in 1927 Coun cil in , 1933 Coun cil in , and 1940 . R&D employment, which stood at 6,274 in 1927 had , by 1933, after fo ur of th e wors t years of th e Depression, climbed to I 0,918. In 1940, after another seven years of do ubl e di git un employ ment, th at number stood at 27,777. Data on the number of labs establi shed, and actu al spending, paint a simi lar pi cture, with particularly dra mati c in creases after 1935 (Mowery and Rosenberg, 2000: 8 14; Field, 20 I I: 56, Table 2.4) .
A second tributary refl ected spill overs from th e government funded bu ild out of the surface road network. The US produced more than four mi lli on passenger ve hicl es in I 929, a level of produ ction not reached again for twenty yea rs (Ca rter el al., 2006, se ri es Df343). By the seco nd half of the decade the growth of vehicl e registrati ons had outrun th e capabilities of th e road infrastructure. A stron g political coalition pressed fo r better roads. Farmers wanted them, compl ainin g that th eir French counterparts moved grain at ha lf th e cost over a superior surfaced road network, whi le American agriculturists faced th e eq ui va lent of a mud tax. Bicyclists wanted th em, car owners and car makers and suppliers to the auto industry (plate glass makers, tyre makers, steel makers) wanted them, as did th e petroleum, asphalt, and motel industri es. Tru ckers wanted th em, as did , perhaps surpri singly, railroads, which saw themselves as evolving a symbiotic relatio nship with tru ckers in whi ch th ey (the railroad s) would be the sen ior partn ers (Paxson, 1946; Fi nch, 1992; Goddard, 1994) .
But the locat ion of a nationa l road netwo rk was a contentious business, because it wou ld mean (as did the building of th e interstates three decades later) th e makin g and breaking of many loca l communities. Sta te highway departments had to reach ag ree ment with each oth er and the federal authoriti es over what routes wo uld be national. By Nove mber of 1926 a treaty had been negoti ated, its term s reflected in th e pub lica ti on of a detai led map showing th e proposed US route system. The country th en started buildin g or improvin g streets, highwa ys, bridges, and tunnels, and if one just looks at th e data for such ex penditures, it is hard to tell that the co untry had a depress ion (there were moderate declines in spendin g,
The full dimens ions of 1hat expan sion we re first app reciated when war planners, in pa rticul a r Simon Ku znet s, began , after Pea rl Harbor, to recko n how much guns and butter the US econom y co uld produce, and were not fully revea led u ntil the massive fiscal a nd m onetary stimulus associated with the Seco nd World War closed the remaining output gap. relati ve to th e late 192 0s, in 1933, 1934, and 1935) .
5 By 194 1, the US ro ute system was complete, and, because of its gro wth , producti vity in transpo rtati o n (both trucking a nd ra ilroads) as well as wholesale and retail distributio n had risen dra mati call y (Field, 2006 (Field, , 2011 . Finall y, so me secto rs, like rai lroads, benefit ed from the ki ck in th e rea r of adversity th at ge nerated creati ve res po nses. In the 1920s, ra ilroads had been able to solve th eir pro blem s essentiall y by th rowing mo ney at them. But, in the 1930s, access to chea p SO-yea r mo rtgage mo ney dri ed up, and by th e middl e of the decade roads respo nsibl e fo r m ore than a third of fi rst track mileage we re in receive rship (Sc hi ffma n, 2003). Rati onali zatio n, including m ajo r adva nces in fre ight interchange, meant big ga ins in efficiency. Progress toward unlimited fre ight interchange began with ga uge sta ndardi zatio n in the 1880s and co ntinu ed d uring the First Wo rld Wa r when, as troops operated the rail system , th e governme nt pressed fo r standardizati o n of equipment and operating procedu res. T he US had a nati o nal rail network, but it consisted of indi vidual lines owned and operated by priva te fi rm s. T he questi o n of what happened wh en, fo r exa mpl e a fre ight car went into 'fore ign' ter rito ry had impo rtant eco no mic consequences. Was it necessary to break cargo? Could a ca r deli vering o uts ide of its system pick up a new load fo r the return trip in a co mpetito r's regio n' If loco motives o r rolling stock broke d own, could they be repaired in a fo reign ya rd?
Developing unifo rm procedures and tari ffs governing in te rline transacti o ns allowed huge effic iency ga in s. T he number of empl oyees, locom otives, fre ight cars, and passenge r ca rs each d ro pped by a q uarter o r a third betwee n 1929 and 194 1. Yet revenue freight to n miles in 194 1 were slightly hi gher th an in 1929 , a nd passe nge r miles we re almost as high . Th ese rati os tra nslated into very significant producti vity gains (S tover, 1997; Field, 2011 : chapter 12, 201 2) .
It is natural to as k, given the coincide nce of the greatest econo mi c depression a nd the most rapid productivity gro wth of the twe ntieth centu ry, whether th ere is a necessary connecti o n betwee n depressio n a nd rapid productivity growth. T here is no simple a nswer. M uch of the coincidence refl ects serendipi ty. A num be r of techno logical pa radigm s we re ripe for explo itati o n at th e time, and a good deal of what hap pened wo uld have happened without the Depressio n. If it were true th at eco no mi c downturn s la id the fo undati o ns fo r hi gher productivity growth in th e fut ure, we could console those o ut of wo rk with th e tho ught that their sacrifi ces we re laying the fo undati o n for a better to mo rro w. To a rgue thus wo uld, however, be both cruel and largely unjusti fie d, because the res po nse of eco no mi c o rga ni zati o ns to ad ve rsity, like that of individu als, varies greatl y. Some sectors did res po nd in ways th at ge ne rated persisting benefit s, and fo r the 1930s the railroad secto r is th e poster child for this style of argument, providing the best suppo rt fo r Ri chard Pos ner's suggesti on that depressio ns may have a sil ve r linin g (Posner, 2009 ). T here is anecdotal evidence that this d ynamic may also have affec ted pa rts of the m anu fac tu ring secto r.
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; Sec Ca rt er ct al. (2006) , ser ies Dc3 7 l. 6 ' in the auto mobile industry parti cu larl y, but in other ma nufactu ring industri es as well, improvem ent s in p lant layout appear to have been greatly stimulated by the depress io n, with resultin g better cont inui ty of t he flow of work and savings in direct and supervisory labo r, eq uipment , fl oo r spa ce, and inventories ' (Wein traub, 1939: 26) .
Technological chan ge during the 1930s involved both product and process innovations: th e developm ent, introducti o n, and refinement of dramatic new products, as well as mo re munda ne cha nges in how th ey we re made or se rvices delivered, that cumulatively and in th e aggrega te made a big difference. So me Depression era adva nce in volved refi nements of products alread y ava il able in th e 19 20s (automobiles a nd mechanical refri ge rato rs are exa mples). In oth er in stances (nylo n a case in point), entirely new m ateri als and products made fr om them we re both developed and roll ed out durin g the Depression yea rs. Finally, resea rch and development restocked the larder for the post-wa r period, by replenishing th e storehouse of o nl y partiall y or minimall y ex ploited innova ti o ns, such as television.
Jn the latter catego ry, Philo T. Farnsworth's d evelo pment of what wo uld be the signature new consumer produ ct of the post-war peri od was financed during the 1930s by San Francisco venture ca pital. After a length y patent dispute, in wh ich Farnsworth preva iled, television was introduced to the public by RCA at the 1939-40 New York World's Fai r, at the same time as commercial broadcasts began. Although production and diffusion was interrupted by the wa r, take-up was extremely rapid beginning in the late 1940s, as is typical for new entertainment as o pposed to labour saving consum er appliances (Bowden and Offer, 1994; Field, 20 10b) .
Adva nces in aero nautica l inn ova ti o n impacted a nasce nt indu st ry during the Depression at the sa me time as they la id th e foundation for war production as we ll as th e post-war aviation secto r. In 1936, Donald Douglas introduced th e DC3 -arguably th e world 's most famous a nd successfu l aircraft (it had a starrin g rol e in the cl osing scenes of the movie Casablanca, alongside Humphrey Bogart and Claude Rain s). Over 16,000 were produced, includin g over 10,000 C-47s-a military version with strength ened floor a nd ca rgo doo rs, built during the war. Seve ral hundred are still in operation. A refl ection of the state of aero nauti ca l adva nce durin g the 1930s (as well as the relatively sho rt period of US in volvem ent in the wa r) is thi s: all US aircraft that saw maj o r service operation in World War Two were already on the drawing boa rds ('substa ntiall y designed') in December of 194 1 (Galbraith , 1967: 22) .
Other p roducts, developed a nd ro lled out during the Depression, ach ieved hi gh penetratio n before th e war began. In 1928 the DuPont Co rpora ti o n lured Wallace Ca ruthers away from hi s labo ra to ry at Harva rd to Delawa re, where he began to develop blockbuster new mate ri a ls including neop rene and nylo n. The compa ny introduced nylo n stockin gs to a ravenous fem ale populati o n o n 15 May 1940, selling almost 5 million pairs th e first day, and 63 milli o n pairs th e first year, befo re production was diverted towa rds pa rachutes and mosquito netting for the Pacific campaigns. Ca ruth ers unfortuna tely did not live to see a ny o f thi s. Suffering from depress ion of a different kind, he co mmitted suicide in 1937 (Hermes, 1996) .
The 1930s also saw major refin ement of products already ava il able to a limited audi ence in the 1920s. Durin g the 1930s, mecha ni cal refri gerators m oved from a 'bleedin g edge' product to a mass production and mass consumpti o n item. In the 1920s, if you asked members of an Ameri can househo ld whether they had refrigerati o n, and they answe red a ffirmatively, it usually mea nt they had an icebox-litera ll y. A huge infrast ru cture supported an industry that cut fro zen water from northern lakes and ponds during the winter, stored the product in in sulated warehouses, and distributed it throughout the year.
Entrepreneurs commerciali zed two systems of mecha ni ca l refri ge rati o n for ho mes during the I 920s. The first, powered by gas, silent and in volving no moving parts, was a rguably the superi o r techno logy (the Serve l Co rpo rati on continu ed to manufacture these into th e 1950s). The other, whose descenda nts cool our food today, in volved mechanical compresso rs driven by an electri c moto r. Electric utiliti es were in volved in ma rketin g the new product, a nd favo ured th e latter techno logy. But th ey did not pu sh home refri gerati o n hard unti l the I 930s.
Durin g th e 1920s, both typ es of refrigerators were boutique products, produced by hundred s of sma ll companies, and ac hieving low penetration. The appli ances were prone to breakd own a nd required a grea t deal of afte r sa les service. Although mecha nica l refrigeration was ava il able, by the end o f the decade, it was in use in on ly a small frac tion , perh aps 3 per cent, of American househo ld s (Tobey, 1996: 17-19) .
In additi o n to questi o ns o f reliability, the sta te of wiring in Ameri ca n households placed se rious obstacles to diffusio n. By th e end of the 1920s a large fraction of urban US ho useholds we re 'electrifi ed '. What th is typicall y mea nt, however, was that the re was o ne light fi xture in the ceiling of each room and perh aps one wa ll o r ' utility' o utl et per roo m . T he o utl ets a nd th e elect ri cal feed co uld ha ndle a fl oo r la mp o r a sm all radio, but th e heavier load s d ema nded by refr ige rato rs o r washing mac hin es would almost certainl y blow a fuse.
By 194 1, man y ho uses had upgraded wiring, mechanica l refri ge rato rs we re mu ch more reliabl e, a nd with experi ence a nd mass production , th eir cost had co me d own. By 1940, 44 per cent of US households had mecha ni cal refri ge rati o n: 56 per cent of urban ho usehold s, 39 per cent of rural no n-fa rm househo lds, a nd 15 per cent of fa rm household s (US Bureau of th e Census Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1948: 813 , Tabl e 9 I 4). T hi s diffu sio n is a concrete ma nifestati o n of the fact that if yo u kept yo ur job during th e Depression, your real hourl y wages went up, and qu ite dramati call y, ri sing at a rate equal to o r exceed ing what occurred in the post-wa r peri od.
In contra st with mecha ni ca l refrige rato rs, auto mobil es had ac hieved mass market sta tus in th e 1920s, with registratio ns increasin g fro m 6.7 millio n to 23. 1 million over th e decade. Because of the Dep ress io n a nd the wa r, ca r producti o n di d not reattain its 1929 peak until I 949. US ca r ma kers neverth eless produced 33.3 milli o n passe nge r vehicl es during the twelve yea rs of th e Depression ( 1930-4 1 inclusive), sli ghtl y mo re than the 32.7 millio n manu fact ured during the eleven yea rs 19 19-29 . Registration s grew by 6.5 milli o n (Carter et al., 2006 : se ri es Df340, Df343). Stated a no th er way, th ere was eno ugh a uto mob il e production during th e Depress io n to replace every ca r registered in 1929 at leas t o nce, as well as add millions to the stock of those o n the road by th e tim e the war bega n.
And the cars were much improved . Radios, heaters, a nd four wheel hydrau lic brakes were now standard. Auto mati c transmission , power stee ring, a nd mo re powerfu l engines beca me options. Tyres moved from th e na rro w profile hi gh pressure products of th e I 920s-refl ecting the birth of th e automobile in the bicycle industry-to the low pressure ba ll oon tyres upon which most of us ro ll toda y. Ve hicl es we re strea mlin ed a nd mo re aerody namic, with headlights a nd trunks (boots) in co rporated into th e body rather than add -o ns. Raff and T rachtenberg ( 1997) see th e d ecade of th e 193 0s as th e las t in whi ch major inn ovations in veh icl e design took place.
Although the absolute numbers were smaller, the percentage increase in truck and bus production and registrations was even larger. Truck registrations grew from 3.5 million in 1929 to 5.2 million in 1941, and bus registrations almost quadrupled, from 34,000 in 1929 to 120,000 in 1941. Combined truck and bus production between 1929 and 1941 inclusive totalled 7.5 million, as compared with 4.9 million between 1919 and 1929 inclusive (Carter et al., 2006 : series Df34 l, Df342, and Df345). As was the case for automobiles, there was enough production during the Depression to replace every truck and bus on the road in 1929 at least once, and add millions more to the transportation system. These newer vehicles were, on average, larger, more powerful, and more reliable.
Although perhaps less visible to the consumer, the 1930s were also a great age of process and materials innovations. There were big improvements in thermal efficiency, as well as gains based on the exploitation of square-cube relationships in the construction of, for example, larger boilers. In 1941, US output of electricity was 87 per cent above its 1929 level, driven largely by improvements in productivity, as well as government expansion of hydropower. The bulk of the industry, however, relied then, as it does today, on fossil fuel to drive steam turbines. Here, topping techniques used the steam from high pressure boilers to heat lower pressure boilers. Topping raised capacity by 40 to 90 per cent with no increase in fuel costs or labour. More generally, throughout industry, exhaust gasses from stacks were used to preheat air to improve combustion, preheat materials for subsequent fabrication, or generate steam (Weintraub, 1939: 20) .
Improvements in thermal efficiency also benefited from attention to low cost, but often high payoff, investments in insulation. Similarly, modest investments in instrumentation yielded big efficiency gains, facilitating automatic process control, which lengthened the life of equipment, and reduced downtime and maintenance costs. The cost of instruments was often trivial compared to the improvements in capital and labour productivity they enabled. In the 1920s, cracking units in petroleum refining needed to be cleaned every four to five days. Instrumentation cut this to every one or two months. Hand controlled boilers required rebricking every three months; instrument controls eliminated the need to do so entirely. Engineers and chemists also made great progress in finding new uses for solid and liquid by-products, thus performing the alchemy of turning industrial excrement into gold.
Machinery became larger, which often resulted in scale economies. Industrial locomotives sold between 1932 and 1936 averaged 11.4 tons, versus 7.4 tons between 1924 and 1927 . The capacity of a power shovel rose from 1.73 cubic yards in 1920-23, to 1.90 in 1924-27, to 2.51 in 1928-31, to 3.28 cubic yards in 1932-36 . Square-cube relationships meant that capital and operating costs per unit of output dropped when capacity increased. This dynamic could also be observed in electric power generating units as well as in the spiral conveyer screws used to move materials in flour mills (Weintraub, 1939: 17) .
Advances in chemical engineering and the use of new materials made contributions as well. Better treatments extended the Life of wooden railroad ties from eight to twenty years. Quick drying lacquers reduced the time needed to paint a car from more than three weeks in the early 1920s to a few hours, with consequent reductions in inventory costs. Stainless steel reduced oxidization on railway cars, while chrome plating lengthened the lives of tools and moving parts. Carbon steel blades had to be removed and resharpened after cutting 60 feet of plastic. A tungsten ca rbon all oy bl ade co uld cut I 0,000 fee t with out refi ttin g. Subst ituting plast ics fo r wood o r metal parts saved in fu el, fab ri catio n, and cap ital cos ts (Wei ntraub, 1939: 21, 23) .
The 1930s also saw th e tail end of th e revo luti on in factory layo ut and des ign th at had prod uced such ex traordi nary TFP ga in s in manufacturin g betwee n 19 19 and l 929 (over 5 per cent per yea r). That revolution in volved repl ac in g systems fo r distributing powe r intern all y within a factory . Nin eteen th -centu ry systems were mechanica l, relying o n leath er belts and mechani ca l shaf1s and gea rs to move power from a prime mover, usua ll y eith er a stea m engin e or a water wheel. The ca noni cal nineteenth -century bri ck facto ry building was fou r or fi ve sto ri es tall. Multi -story buildings represented an engin eering solution to th e prob lem, given th e energy losses from fricti on in mechani ca l power distributio n, of minimi zing th e sum of run s from the central powe r so urce. Si nce many of th e new fac to ry tow ns were o n greenfi eld sites, bu ildi ng up was rarely di ctated by hi gh land valu es.
In a process that ga th ered momentum in th e seco nd decade of th e twe nti eth century, and continued at an acce lerated pace during th e l 92 0s , busin esses replaced mechanica l systems with networks of electri ca l wire and sma ll indi vidu al electric moto rs. Th e transiti on removed a straightj acket from fac tory design . Twe nti eth -century factories are typi ca ll y one or two stori es, with skylights to improve li ghtin g and ve ntilat ion , as well as overh ead sys tems fo r mov ing subassemb lies o r power tools. Even with out a new building, rippin g out th e shaft s and belts prod uced imm edi ate and large ga ins. Under th e old system th ere was prime real estate directl y under th e shafts-but much of th e rest of th e fl oo r space was low va lue-used for storage o r oth erwise wasted. With electric wirin g and small electric motors, space cou ld be used much more effic ientl y ( Field , 2011: chapt er 2; Devine, 1983) . And freed fina ll y from th e dirt, grim e, and lu bri ca ting oil s drippin g fro m ove rh ead shafts, fac tori es co uld beco me much cl eane r.
Ry 1929, ro ughl y three-qu arters of US indu stria l capac it y had already expe rienced this transiti on, 7 with results refl ected in strong TFP growth ac ross all two digit manufacturin g industri es (F ield, 20 1 I: 52 -3, Tab le 2.2). This tra nsition could propel manufacturing TFP to permanen tl y higher levels but , as the Solow growth model reminds us, could not permanently in crease growth rat es. Still , as th e 1930s bega n, there was some juice left in this fruit. ln 1933, fo r exampl e, Cadill ac co nso lid ated producti on of drive train s from fo ur floo rs onto one, leavin g th e oth er three available for oth er uses. In 1934, Packard cut in half its floor space Within ma nufactur ing, elec tric motor horsq,owe r more than doubled betwee n 19 19 and 1929, fro m 15.6 13 mil lion in 1919 lo 33 .844 million, and in creased furth er lo 45.29 1 mil lion in 1939 (this in clud es motors dri ven by purchased cl eclricit y as well as those that used eleclricil y ge nerat ed on sit e) . Oth er power used directl y in producti on in 1929 incl ud ed 9.157 milli on horsepo wer from steam engi nes, 1. 203 millio n from internal co mbu sti on engines, and 1.557 mill io n fro m hyd ro lurbin es and wate r wh eels. Manufacturing also ex pl oit ed 7.410 111illion of steam tu rbine horsepower, but most of this was probabl y used for onsite generatio n of electri ci ty rather than directl y in th e production of moti ve power. Brin ging these numbers together, we can co nclude that, in 1929, 33.84 4 milli on out of a total of 45.76 1 million horsepower used d irectl y to produ ce moti ve power (74 per ce nt ) was pro,·idcd by electri c mot ors. This slightl y underestimates th at share sin ce most of th e hydroturbin es (included in th e data with wat er whee ls) were probabl y al so used fo r onsite electri city gen eration rath er than directl y for 111 otive power ( requirements per unit of output, freeing an entire building, and similar improvements were reported by Westinghouse and Western Electric. And by rearranging machinery in a linear pattern and changing the way materials were handled, the textile industry garnered high rates of productivity growth during a period in which spinning and weaving technology remained largely unchanged. In other industries, electrically driven conveyer belts saved labour, but also saved capital through the elimination of waste, reduction of spoilage, and shortening of time in process (Weintraub, 1939: 24-25) .
Nevertheless, as the gains in manufacturing from this source waned, TFP growth in the sector would inevitably weaken. And indeed, manufacturing TFP growth declined by alm ost half, comparing 1929-4 1 with 1919-29, although remaining world class by any standard of comparison other than the 1920s (Field, 2011: 54, Table 2 .3). An important question is what kept it from fa lling further. The answer is to be fo und in the remarkable development of a privately funded R&D system, some of whose contributions we have already discussed.
In the 1920s, almost all (about fo ur-fifths) of the 2 per cent per year TFP growth in the private non-farm economy is attrib utable to the 5 per cent per year sectoral growth in manufacturi ng (Field, 2011: 69 Table 2 .10). It is true that the manufacturing share of national income grew in the 1930s, but since its TFP growth rate was declining, it is obvious that the explanation for a higher private non-farm economy (PNE) TFP growth rate in the 1930s must be found in part in other secto rs.
The other major source, as noted, was spillovers in transportation and distribution resulting from the build-out of the su rface road network. High rates of productivity growth in trucking, railroad transportation, and trade, weighted by their sectoral shares, in the aggregate made a contribution to PNE TFP growth in the 1930s roughly equal in magnitude to that of manufacturing. Railway productivity soared, in part because of institutional and organizational changes involving freight interchange, but also because the paving and extension of the road network solved a critical peak load problem that had plagued the system in prior decades.
Railways depended on surface roads to move merchandise the final mile to households, but many of these roads were impassable because of snow or mud during much of the yea r. Thus, the demand for freight cars exceeded capacity for four months of the year, while the system had to carry excess capacity for the remainder. Road improvements largely solved this problem. The developing symbiotic relationship with the flexible and rapidly growing trucking system meant that rai lways performed much better in the Second as opposed to the First World War, when they were taken over and operated by government troops. Another contributor to better performance during 194 1-45 was that it was a two front war-in the Pacific as well as the Atlantic-thus solvi ng the backhaul (east to west) problem that had bedevilled the system in 1917 and 1918. The trucking industry, in turn, grew very rapidly, experiencing high rates of productivity advance. Together, these improvements allowed big gains in efficiency in wholesale and retail trade (Goddard, 1994; Field, 2003, 20 11: chapter 2) .
By 1941 , the US ro ute system was complete, and the beginnings of a network of controlled access highways could be seen in the Pennsylvania Turnpike and the Pasadena Freeway. Although the almost exclusively two lane US route system would eventually be overshadowed by the Interstate system begun fifteen years later, at the time the US system represented a huge improvement over what it replaced, both in the engineering standards to which it was built and in the simple fact, in many parts of the country, that it was paved.
These developments, and others like them, underlie what we see in agg regate measures of output and productivity. A rough measure of the technological and organiza tional progressivity of an era is how much more rapidly output grows than a weighted average of the growth of labour and physical capital (structures and equipment). That difference, or residual, represents the growth of total factor productivi ty. The basic arithmetic of growth accounting over the twelve years of the Depression is fa irly simple. In the PNE, which excludes agriculture and government but covers almost everything else-about three-quarters of GDP-labour hours grew not at all between 1929 and 194 1, and the priva te sector capital stock remained also, in the aggregate, basica]]y unchanged. Yet real output in 194 1 was between 33 and 38 per cent higher (the di ffe rence depends upon whether or not we use the newer chained index estimates of output-see the appendix). The result is a TFP growth rate of between 2.3 and 2.5 per cent per year in the PNE.
These ra tes of increase are before a cyclical adjustment. Since at least the end of the nineteenth century, TFP growth has been pro-cyclical, which means it tends to fall when th e output gap rises, and increases as a recession ends (Field, 2010a) . Idea]]y, to abstract from these cyclical influences, we would measure from business cycle peak to business cycle peak. This is not entirely possible fo r the Depression because, although 1929 can be considered a pea k, the unemployment ra te in 194 1 was still 9.9 per cent. If we use chained index estimates of output, and make a cyclical adjustment as described in th e appendix, both TFP and labour p roductivity growth approach 3 per cent per yea r across the Depression years. Since private sector input growth was effectively absent, all of the growth in output was on account of TFP advance. And since there was virtually no capital deepening, almost all of the growth in output per hour (labour productivity) can also be attributed to TFP growth.
Output growth in the vicini ty of 3 per cent per yea r between 1929 and 1941 is not, per se, unusual. The long run 'speed limit' for the US since at least the end of the Civil War has been a little over 3 per cent per year. But in other periods much of that is due to input growth. What is unusual about the Depression experience, from a growth accoun ting perspective, is that almost all is attributable to TFP advance.
THE OUTPUT GAP
The increase of potential (and, as th e outp ut gap closed, actual) output across the Depression years was quite high, with most of the gain , especially in the fo rmer, driven by record breaking TFP advance. At the same time, the 1930s were distinguished by high unemployment and a very poor record of capacity utilization, particularly between 1929 and 1933. In this section, I consider three related issues. First, th e causes of the rising unemployment and sharp decline in output between 1929 and 1933. Second, the fa ilure of the output gap to close completely ' Kendrick includes ann ual index n umbers in levels going back to 1889, and then index n umbers for the ten year peri ods 1879-88 and 1869-78. O ne way to calculate growth ra tes leading up to th e 1892 business cycle pea k wo uld be to ce ntre the 1869-78 observatio n o n 1873.5 and sim ply calculate a continuo usly compo unded growt h ra te. This yields 2.38 per cent per yea r. But this esti ma te is too high because 1873.5-indeed the whole period of post civil war adjustment-is no t a business cycle pea k, and th is procedure will bias upwa rds a TFP calc ulatio n since we will meas ure fro m a tro ugh to a business cycle pea k. An altern ate proced ure is to run a regressio n thro ugh th e logged values of 1879-88 (ce ntred o n 1873.5), 1879-88 (ce ntred o n 1883.5), and annual observati o ns fro m 1889-1907. This retu rn s a trend growth ra te over the entire period of 1.59 per ce nt per yea r. To be consistent with the estimate of 1.59 per cent per yea r from 1869-78 to 1907, we need a trend growth rate of 1.95 per cent per yea r betwee n 1869-78 and 1892. That is, TFP growth of 1.95 per cent fro m 1873.5 to 1892, and I.I I per cent th erea fter, is consistent wi th 1.59 per cent per yea r over the whole period.
• O utput per adjusted ho ur uses an hours index that has been augmented to refl ect changes in labo ur q uali ty or compositio n. In crea ting this index, di ffe rent ca tegori es of labo ur are we ighted by their sectoral wage rates. TFP calculations arc made using the adj us ted ho urs series. Fo r details o n the cyclical adjustment fo r 194 1, please see the append ix. ' Rates of ca pital deepenin g are approximatel y eq ual to the d ifference betwee n the growth rate of ca pital prod ucti vit y and the growth rate of labour producti vity. In the 1930s, John Maynard Keynes developed a mordant and compelling critique of the then (and again, un til relatively recentl y) dominant view that th e normal tendency of an economy, free fro m interference fro m unions, business cartels, or government, is toward full employment. If the views against which Keynesian thinking was (and sometimes still is) opposed are correct, we do not really need the concepts of full employment or an output gap. Employmen t is always, in a sense, 'full ', and the distinction between voluntary and involuntary unemployment moot. Lower employment to population ratios can be attributed to individuals' dynamic reallocation of labour supply over the li fe cycle. An economy tends automatically to produce at potential, and the only meaningful way we can speak of an output gap is as a measure of the difference between what the economy is actually producing and what it could produce absent the deleterious interventions of governments or unions.
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When the economic downturn began in 2008, the stream of modern macroeconom ics developing out of the real business cycle tradition unfortunately had very little constructive contribution to policy discussions. Faced with a developing financial crisis, and potentially catastrophic decline in aggregate demand, policy makers in the United States pulled out their intermediate macroeconomics textbooks, dusted off their IS-LM analysis, and began to calculate how large multipliers might be and what kind of fiscal and monetary stimulus was needed to avoid disaster. The experience of countries such as Britain where, ironically, policymaking was less influenced by Keynesian thinking, and indeed often operated in antagonism to its tenets, provides additional evidence that the framework Keynes developed for thinking about the performance of an economy in the short run remains as relevant as ever. Political constraints limited the size of the fiscal response in the United States. These constraints were, however, even more severe in Britain, which weathered a downturn whose depth and duration was comparatively worse than that in the United States.
The best overarching explanation for the Depression continues to be that it resulted from a collapse and slow revival of aggregate demand. To make this argument in its starkest form , we lack a plausible explanation of how potential output could have fallen so much between 1929 and 1933. There is little evidence that a large fraction of the US labour force decided between 1929 and 1933 voluntarily to reallocate its labour supply to subsequent years, or that Henry Ford suddenly forgot how to run an assembly line, or that a substantial portion of the population fell prey to a mysterious virus, or that war destroyed a major portion of the country's capital stock. All such hypotheticals would indeed have lowered potential output, but nothing remotely comparable occurred during this time frame.
To say that the Depression was principally caused by a decline and then slow revival in the growth of nominal income does not, however, preclude attention to supply-side conditions with which this interacted. In particular, we can ask to what degree obstacles on the supply side may have worsened the downturn or provided obstructions to revival, and to what degree these were the consequence of government action .
There is a venerable tradition in macroeconomic and monetary theory focused on whether or not money is 'neutral' in the short as well as the long run, that is, whether it can have real effects on output and employment. The way the question is typically posed reflects acceptance of a key premise in Milton Friedman's monetary framework (1971) , the proposition that the demand to hold cash (money) is a stable function of a limited number of variables, and moreover, that there is little interest elasticity to the demand for money. Friedman's work provided much of the intellectual underpinning for attempts by central banks in the late 1970s and early 1980s to adopt constant growth rate of the money supply rules.
Such rules, and monetarism as a coherent intellectual philosophy, have been largely abandoned today and replaced with an operational emphasis on interest rate targeting, influenced by some version of the Taylor rule.
9 One of the reasons for the demise of monetarism as a guide to policy is that the demand for money or near monies has in fact proven to be quite unstable, subject, particularly in times of uncertainty or financial instability, to large perturbations based on sudden increases in the demand for liquidity, as well as flexibility in the face of changes in nominal interest rates.
A broader and more encompassing way of framing questions of neutrality is to ask whether fluctuations in nominal income are neutral in both the short and long run. Nominal income (GDP) is the product of real income or output and the GDP deflator. It is also arithmetically the product of the stock of money and the income velocity of money, with velocity defined as nominal income divided by the money stock. The money stock, in turn can be understood as the monetary base (high powered money), as Ml, or as whatever aggregate one chooses, as long as income velocity is defined in a corresponding manner.
Nominal income and its growth fluctuate, as Friedman emphasized, because the level or growth rates of nominal money change. But they can also fluctuate because of changes in velocity, which can be due to perturbations in the demand to hold money, or particular forms of cash, as well as changes in fiscal variables (government tax and spending programmes) or changes in private sector spending propensities, especially those associated with the acquisition of investment goods (structures or equipment) and consumer durables. 10 Friedman's neutrality question, redefined, becomes whether, when for any of the reasons described above, nominal income falls, or its rate of growth decelerates, this has real effects on output and employment, and, if so, how large they are. Rigidities and/or negative changes on the supply side can make a difference in terms of the size of such effects.
Here it can be useful to partition these supply-side conditions into two categories: those that could in principle be overcome, either temporarily or permanently, by reversing the decline or slow growth of nominal income, and those that could not. For example, downwardly inflexible wages would not contribute significantly to an output decline in the absence of nominal income decline. In contrast, a 9 The Taylor rul e, developed by John Taylor of Sta nford University, attempts to captu re how central banks do, and perh aps should, respond to their dual mandates of controlling infl ation and fo stering full employment . Taylor posited th at central bankers aspire to 2 per cent inflation (th e id eal would be no inflation , but given that this is an imperfect business, they prefer a 2 perce ntage point buffer to reduce the likelihood of undershooting, which could yield defl ation -which ca n also have deleterious consequences). Assuming a long run real interest rate of about 2.5 per cent, th eir base target is 4.5 per cent nominal, increased in th e presence of higher than desired inflation, decreased in the presence of a persisting output gap.
10 Only when velocity is invariant do questions of monetary and nominal income neutrality become th e same.
negative aggregate supply shock that caused a third of the population and labour fo rce to become permanently incapacitated, or a sudden, overnight change in workers' preferences in favour of leisure over wo rk, or work fi ve years fro m now versus wo rk this year, could not be overcome, in terms of their effects on real output, simply by higher nominal income growth. The problem ofl ower real output in these latter cases would not be that there has been a widening of the outpu t gap, but ra ther that potential output had, in a real sense, actually declined.
In terms of developments in the latter category, however, there is, as noted, no smoking gun on the supply side that can expl ain the rise of the un employment rate from 3.2 per cent in 1929 to 25 per cent in 1933 and the 27 per cent decline in real output between these yea rs. This cannot plausibly be attributed to a rise in the natural rate of unemployment because of changes in the demographic composition of the labour fo rce, or increases in the attractiveness of living on th e dole, or civil wa r, or some sudden collective amnesia about how to manufac ture steel. That is why, in discussing the Depressio n, we talk in terms of an increase in the output gap. It is why we describe most of that unemployment as involuntary.
11 And it is why we continue to explore the role of changes in spending propensities, liquidity shocks, bank fa ilures, inadequate Federal Reserve response, and other factors in bringing this about.
D istingui shing between these categories of supply conditions can m atter when we move into discussions of proximate and ultimate cause. Suppose, fo r example, we believe that Irving Fisher's debt deflatio n mech anism is important in prolo nging depressions. Obviously, without a deflationary impulse, debt defl ation could not operate. But equally obviously, that mechanism depends on a system of borrowing and lending in which interest payments are fixed in nominal terms. In an imagined world of fully indexed debt contracts, the results for the economy would differ. In this case, however, it is still appropriate to describe the downturn as being caused by th e shock to nominal income, not the absence of indexed loan contracts. The potential output of the economy would not rise with the introduction of full y indexed loan contracts (although its vulnerabilities to recessions might decline).
Similarly, if institutional changes have increased the downwa rd inflexibility of money wages, and output falls in the face of a defl ationary demand shock, it is app ropriate to say that the output loss has been caused by the demand shock, not the absence of a completely flexible nominal wage system in which the spot price of labour rose and fell with demand conditions as does the price of wheat. The introduction of a regime of more downwardl y flexible money wages wo uld not 11 Thus, while I am broadly sympathetic to many of the concl usions of Hatton and Thomas (201 3) , 1 find implausible th eir suggestio n that the NA lRU (non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment) rose 12 percentage points, fro m 4.2 to 16.9 per cent in the US during the Depression. Every period of elevated unem ployment in the United States has bro ught fo rth a literatu re suggesti ng that this has been caused by a rise in th e NA IRU . For the 1970s see, fo r exampl e, Tobi n (1977). I am receptive to the argument th at the N AIRU may tem porarily ri se as the consequence of an economic downturn hysteresis due to atrophying of labour market attachment among the long term unemployed. But I am sceptical when large increases in the unemployment rate are attributed after the fact to rises in the NAlRU, that is, when the causal roles are reversed.
mean that the potential output of the economy had actually risen, nor would downward inflexibili ties mean that it had fa llen.
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In a series of papers, Lee Ohanian (2003 Ohanian ( , 2009 , sometimes in collaboration with his co-author, Harold Cole (Cole and Ohanian, 2000 , 2002 , 2004 , has argued that government-induced negative supply shocks explain much of the Depression's depth and duration. Although the specific culprits and particular emphases have differed as this research programme has developed, three policies have borne the brunt of the blame. First, a meeting organized by President Hoover in November of 1929 in which the president encouraged manufacturers to hold the line against nominal wage cuts in the face of what was then anticipated as a likely recession. Second, the passage in 1933 of the National Industrial Recovery Act. And third, the passage of the Wagner Act establishing the National Labour Relations Board in 1935, providing a more favourable environment for union organizing.
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If the Cole and Ohanian papers have a common thread, it is the claim that the main explanation for the Depression is not that nominal income was too low, but that wages were too high. In particular, they argue, between 1929 and 1933 (or at least through 1931), jawboning by Hoover kept nominal wages from falling. After 1933, New Deal policies not only kept them from falling, but caused them to rise. In both instances, policy actions allegedly made the Depression worse. It is true that the CPI fell further than nominal wages during the worst years of the Depression. This meant that if you managed to keep your job and your hours, your real standard of living actually improved slightly between 1929 and 1933. Real wages then began to rise very sharply after 1933, along with economic recovery, as a large output gap began to close. Perhaps the suggestion is that if nominal wages had fallen even further, real wages could have declined, and the Depression thus avoided.
12 Except in the sense that even in a dynamic economy with positive but low inflation, the flexibility might facilitate sectoral readjustment. 13 Cole and Ohanian's work is part of a larger body of work intent on blaming recessions on govern ment action. Other examples include Jude Wanniski's (1978 ) attribution of the Depression to the Smoot-Hawley tariff, or Robert Higgs' emphasis on the second New Deal, especially the work of the Temporary National Econom ic Com mittee, often interpreted as hostile to big business, as well as the more aggressive enforcemen t of antitrust policy. 14 l interpret their argument in terms of nominal wages, because that is all an employer can set; real wages can only be known after the fact. 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1929=100 I-+-CPI ---David-Solar unskilled ...,._ Real Hourly wage unskilled! Cole and Ohanian are, however, sceptical that the standard explanations of nominal income decline-bank failures, the absence of adequate Fed response, high real interest rates, and disruptions to the credit machinery-had much to do with the downturn. In support of this view, they cite the rise in the loan to output ratio between 1929 and 1932 as evidence that loanable funds were actually quite abundant during these years (Ohanian, 2003 (Ohanian, : 1212 .
This, however, misinterprets what was actually happening during a period in which prices were falling and hundreds, indeed thousands, of banks were failing. Since most loan obligations were fixed in nominal terms, with deflation we would expect this ratio to have risen even if there had been no new loans to be had at any price after 1929. The numerator would have declined moderately as existing loans ran off, but the denominator would likely have been dropping even more rapidly (nominal GDP declined 46 per cent between 1929 and 1933) . 15 The trend in this ratio is simply reflective of the operation of Fisher's debt deflation mechanism: the real burden of debt rose with unanticipated deflation. The rise in the burden of debt, and the increase in its value for those to whom it was owed, is consistent with the fact that despite loan defaults, bond interest was the only category of income to capital to rise between 1929 and 1933 (Field, 2011: 269) .
The data on wages for production workers paint a very similar story. These numbers are perhaps even more relevant for the Ohanian argument, since they pertain to workers who would presumably have been most affected by restraint on the part of the captains of industry upon whom Hoover was, aJlegedly, effectively leaning. Here we see nominal wages dropping 10 per cent between 1929 and 1931, the period most emphasized in Ohanian's analysis, and 21 per cent between 1929 and 1933.
Neither of these series suggests that nominal wages were downwardly inflexible. Ohanian may wish that wages had fallen more, or suspect that absent Hoover, they would have fallen more. It is, however, questionable whether a faster rate of nominal wage decline would have lessened the cumulative output loss between 1929 and 1933, particularly in a world of non-indexed loan contracts and interest rates that cannot go below zero. There is, moreover, some question whether Hoover's jawboning had any significant effect on the course of nominal wages. Rose (2010) finds no evidence that industry attendance at the December 1929 conference affected the timing of reductions in nominal wages.
With respect to the 1933-41 period, our analysis can be somewhat more nuanced. We can grant the Cole-Ohanian premise that New Deal policies and legislation played a role in raising both nominal and real wages. But we should also take exception to their characterization of the recovery from 1933 as 'weak' (Ohanian, 2003 (Ohanian, : 1205 . Post 1933 recovery, particularly between 1933 and 1937 (which includes the period of the NRA (National Recovery Administration)) , was in fact extraordinarily strong, with rapid rises in output, employment, and income to capital as well as labour. The stock market increased by a factor of five from its trough in 1932 to its peak in 1937. Growth in real output was also strong from 1938-41, following the Wagner Act and big increases in unionization, although stock market gains were lower. Overall, output, wages, and income to capital all grew very rapidly between 1929 and 1941, and particularly between 1933 and 1941. We should not be surprised by this coincidence, since national income accounting identities tell us that the sum of income flows must approximately equal the flow of output.
How exceptional was this growth? In 1937 real output was 43 per cent higher than it had been in 1933 (NIP A, Table 1.1.6). Over those four years the economy grew at a continuously compounded rate approaching 9 per cent per year. Real output in 1941 was 91 per cent higher than in 1933-almost twice as high-a continuously compounded rate of growth of 8 per cent per year over a period that included the sharp recession of 1937-38. It is of course true that the output gap was not finally closed until 1942, which is why Ohanian can use, as evidence of weak recovery, the observation that output in 1939 was 'below trend'.
The proximate cause of recovery after 1933 was revival in the growth of aggregate demand; the particular contributors to this are discussed elsewh ere in this volume. One important factor was the removal of the straightjacket on monetary growth resulting from the abandonment of the gold standard. Policy measures ended the deflation, allowing real interest rates to decline, and investment, output, and employment to begin growing again. But backstage, as the drama of this revival unfolded, potential output grew by leaps and bounds, 0 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 -+-CPI .._ Margo Production Workers Real Hourly Wage Production Workers helping to sustain an output gap that did not close compl etely un til after the US entered the wa r. Its persiste nce can partl y be attri buted to supply-side obstacles to recovery in sectors such as constructio n (see below in this section). But it was also the case that producti vity advance, whi ch reduced th e inputs required to produce a give n output, contributed to slower employment growth. Concerns with technological unemployment were widespread during the Depression and, although in a well managed economy these should not be an issue over the longer run, wo rries abo ut the effects of innovation on job growth had a basis over the short to medium term .
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T here is no historical necessity that labour will share, or share proportionately in productivity gains. In sti tutions, politics, and culture matter. To take an extreme case, in a slave system, improvements will devolve almost entirely to the benefit of the own ing class. Slave prices may be bid up, perhaps providing some add itional incentives fo r better housing, foo d, and medical care, but most of the gains go to the owners. 'Free' labour markets are not all of one ki nd, and can be govern ed by qui te di ffe rent legal and institutional rules affecting, fo r example, how easy it is fo r labo ur to orga nize and bargain coll ectively.
Twentieth-century evidence suggests that there is a range of correspondence between wages and productivity-both levels and rates of growth-that can allow Table D-2. fu ll employment, the accumulation of physical and human capital, and healthy economic growth. In the I 960s, for example, as governments and compa nies in the United States and Europe dealt with strong organized labour movements, a consensus emerged that a wo rkable course of action was to agree-at the national level, if possible-that wage gains wo uld rise roughly alongside productivity gains. That incomes policy was considered within the realm of political d iscourse testifies to the fact th at, under different circumstances, wage gains might or might not keep up with producti vity gains, or might exceed them.
Cole and Ohanian do not dispute that producti vity rose sharply, particularly after 1933. But they emphasize that wages rose fas ter, arguin g (2002: 30) that the ra tio of wages to producti vity betwee n 1929 and 1939 increased in the United States by 25 per cent, and implying that the New Deal policies that allowed labour to reap a d isproportionate share of productivity gains were an impediment to full recovery. A look at Figures 12. 1 and 12.2, in conjunction with Table 12 .1, does indeed show that wages increased even fas ter than measures of productivity.
But the rise in this ra tio has to be understood in the context of what had transpi red in th e 1920s. The 1920s were a period of high and rising income inequality, leading to levels rivalled only by what we have been experiencing in the most recent decade. If we look at the ratio of the real hourly wage of production workers to Kendrick's estimate of output per hour in manufac turing across the entire interwar period, we place in perspective the increase in the ratio to which Cole and Ohanian call our attention (see Figure 12. 3). W hat we see is that, in terms of real hourly wages, labour shared hardly at all in the very large productivity gains in manufac turing duri ng the 1920s. Workers did benefit from relati vely full employment, which sustai ned household income, and increased opportunities for buying on credit allowed consumption to rise. It is nevertheless fair to say that capital reaped almost all of the gains from productivity growth in the 1920s.
This underscores the political dimension of H oover's November 1929 meeting. A concern about labour peace was understandable, since th e insult of widespread unemployment was about to be added to the injury of having received in the 1920s, in the form of increments to real hourl y wages, a very sm all share of the preceding decade's productivity gains. This was understood at the time, if not precisely in these terms. As Hoover argued in 193 1, ' [w]ages during Prosperity we nt nowhere near so high, comparatively, as commodi ty prices, business profits and dividends; therefore they should not come down with the ge neral decline ' (Time, 13 April 1931 , cited in Ohanian, 2009 . Following a decade in which labour reaped virtually none of the gains from prosperi ty, the economy in 1929 was poised to go into a devastating depression, in spite of wages th en prevailing that were low in comparison with what they would have been had labour shared in the 1920s gains. Cole and Ghanian's criticism seems to be that Hoover did not do more to insure that real wages declin ed even further relative to productivity levels.
Before leaving Cole and Ohanian, it is wo rth mentioning a notable paper that rece ntly appeared in the Journal of Eco nomic H istory, because it goes to the heart of the real business cycle approach that informs their wo rk. InkJaa r et al. (2011 ) apply a m ethodology pioneered by Basu et al. (2006) which extrac ts from the Solow productivity measures that portion due to systematic pro-cyclicality. Because of the inability of the private secto r as a whole to get rid of physical capital in a down turn, and thus avoid ongoing depreciation and holding costs, the economy tends to experience short run increasing returns to scale as the output ga p closes (see Field, 201 0a) .
17 This is different from saying that the economy is subject to long run increas ing returns to scale. What it means is that, while TFP really does go down (or experiences a reduced rate of growth ) during a recession, this is not because of technological regress.
If we 'purify' measures of TFP by removing these cyclical effects, we can then test whether there is any discernible short run relationship between purified TFP and input levels, a key prediction of the REC app roach. InkJaa r et al. (20 11 ) show that fo r US manufact uring between 19 19 and 1939 there is none. Their wo rk is consistent with the view that the pro-cyclicality of TFP is principally drive n by aggregate demand flu ctuations, which, as one goes into recession, cause decl ines in output that are greater than the reduction of inputs, especially those associated with physical capital, particularly structures. By and large, observed TFP procyclicality is the consequence of business cycles, not their ca use.
Although it is doubtful that Hoover's and Roosevelt's labour market policies we re responsible for much of the Depression, there we re supply-side problems standing in the way of full recovery. Perhaps most impo rtant was the legacy of premature subdivision and fractionated land ownership that resulted fro m th e 17 Voluntary labour hoarding is the more typ ical explanatio n for pro-cylical productivity. It is clea rl y relevant in some instances-particularly in earl y stages of a downturn where it may not be clear how long the recession will last. Bu t l question the persistence an d generality of the phenomenon, emphasizing instead the involuntary dynam ic with respect to physical capital as the more funda mental and general cause. See also Field (20 I Oc).
uncontrolled land boom of the 1920s. I discuss the details of this at length in Field (1992) ; see also Field (2011: chapter 11) . Neither commercial nor residential construction reattained its 1920s peaks until after the war, although commercial came back somewhat more robustly than residential. The slow revival of commercial construction is partly attributable to capital saving innovation that made more efficient use of floor space, particularly in manufacturing. The obstacles to increased residential construction were different. They included large transactions costs associated with tracking down owners of record, clearing up tax liens, and paying mortgage obligations on properties comprising failed 1920s subdivisions, many of which had been poorly designed from the standpoint of automobile transportation.
18 If we are searching for supply-side obstacles to full employment, their contribution to the coll apse and slow revival of spending on residential construction is a stronger candidate.
The idea that construction held the key to understanding incomplete recovery is not novel, and was widely shared by economists both before and after the war. As Kenneth Roose, writing in 1954, said, .. . many believed construction bore a heavy responsibility for the low level of economic activity in the 1930s. This belief was held by analysts with widely differin g theoretical approaches to the recession and business fluctuations in general. Thus th e National City Bank of New York, The Economist, and [Alvin] Hansen attached importance to the weakness of the building industry . .. [Hansen] concluded "It is in this area that one finds the explanation for the incomplete recovery of the thirties" (1954: 14) .
In Field (2011: 271) , I calcu late that the low level of residential and, to a lesser degree, non-residential construction spending relative to a 1920s baseline was responsible for approximately half of the output gap remaining at the local peak in 1937. Had potential output grown at its long term rate of approximately 3 per cent per year, it would have increased from $87.2 billion (I take 1929 actual as potential) to $1 10.9 billion in 1937 dollars. This can be compared with actual 1937 output of $91.9 billion; the difference is the output gap. Had residential and non-residential construction spending each retained the rough equality with equipment spending characteristic of the 1920s, there would have been an additional $5.8 billion of gross private domestic investment in 1937 dollars.
Based on the ratio of changes in real output to changes in the sum of the components of autonomous planned spending, I estimate a multiplier of 1.78 for the period 1933 through to 1937 (Field, 2011: 240, 19 This additional construction spending would, therefore, have brought actual output to $102.2 billion, bridging roughly half the distance between actual and potential in 1937. Had exports and consumer durables been at their 1929 levels, output would have been another $2 billion higher, getting us to $104.2 billion. The remainder of the gap could have been closed by an additional injection of less than $4 billion in government or private infrastructure or equipment spending.
The final issue to consider concerns the causes of the sharp recession between 1937 and 1938. Here again, the overarching contributor is likely to have been a contraction in the growth of nominal income. The role of increases in reserve requirements, emphasized by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) has recently been questioned (Calomiris et al., 2011) . Excess reserves were so large at the time that even the higher requirements were not binding. Irwin (2011) has emphasized the empirical significance of the Treasury's gold sterilization policy in restraining the growth of the money supply. But there is a problem with this argument. We can agree that absent sterilization, high powered money would have grown faster. But if Calomiris et al. are right, and reserve requirements were not binding, banks might well simply have held more excess reserves. For these reasons, and although its impact has been questioned by Romer (1992: 776) , fiscal policy seems a better candidate if we are to emphasize a role for aggregate demand in explaining the downturn. There can be little doubt that comparing 1937 with the previous year, the fiscal posture changed from one of expansion associated with veterans' bonus payments, to contraction, associated with the introduction of payroll taxes to finance the new social security system as well as lower government spending on goods and services (NIP A, Table 1.1.6).
That said, other factors were also operative. Joshua Hausman (2011) has argued that the traditional emphasis on monetary and fiscal policy short-changes supplyside factors, in particular those affecting the motor vehicle industry. He notes that the coefficient of variation of changes in state-level private non-farm employment during the recession of 1937-38 was approximately twice what it was in other severe recessions, including 1929-33 and 2007-09 . This was the consequence of particularly steep declines in manufacturing employment in states within which the auto industry was concentrated, such as Michigan, Ohio, and Indiana.
Hausman's story is that car production was hit by a negative supply shock in the form of the unionization of GM and Chrysler and higher raw material costs, leading to price increases in 1938. These increases were anticipated, leading to a shift forward of car sales to the 1937 model year at the expense of 1938 model year purchases. Motor vehicle and parts sales fell more than a third during this recession.
Christina Romer (1992: 763) raises some doubts about this argument, noting that producer prices fell 9.4 per cent. But as Hausman points out, car prices rose, and that is where the big employment losses were. Romer also argues that construction expenditures fell in late 1937, and that interest rates spiked, suggesting clear evidence of monetary tightening. The annual construction data do not seem to be consistent with this story. An index of overall construction contracts awarded (1923-25 = 100) rose from 55 in 1936, to 59 in 1937, to 64 in 1938, to 72 in 1939 (US Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1941: 945 ,  Table 929 ). Housing units starts (in thousands) rose from 304.2 in 1936 , to 332.4 in 1937 , to 399.3 in 1938 (Carter et al., 2006 . Residential investment, which declines in almost all recessions, actually increased slightly across this downturn, although of course, as already noted, it remained quite depressed relative to what had prevailed in the 1920s, and the monthly data do show some effect of the recession. 20 Still, the somewhat anomalous behaviour of residential construction during the 1937-38 downturn suggests that this was not entirely a garden variety recession , such as 1982, in which slowed growth in aggregate demand accounted for almost everything. As for interest rates, the annual data show declines across the board, comparing 1938 with 1937, rather than the spike posited by Romer (Carter et al., 2006 : Series Cj 1224 and 1231 . Nor do the monthly data on short term rates show any evidence of monetary stringency in the fall of 1937 or winter of 1938 (Banking and Monetary Statistics 1914 -1941 .
Finally, we can mention Robert Higgs's argument that the downturn after 1937 is attributable to the second New Deal, and Roosevelt's adoption of more vigorous antitrust enforcement, the Temporary National Economic Committee hearings, and more populist rhetoric (Higgs, 1997) . Supposedly owners of capital went on a capital strike, refusing to invest because of their dislike of Roosevelt or concerns about insecure property rights. There is no doubt that a segment of the electorate hated Roosevelt, although there is little evidence their animosity was worse in 1937 than it had been in 1933. The facts are that owners of capital did much better under Roosevelt than they did under Hoover. And, after falling dramatically in I 938, real gross private domestic investment in 1939 exceeded 1936 levels, and in 1940 exceeded the 1937 peak. These data are hardly consistent with the notion of a 'capital strike' during Roosevelt's second term (USDC, NIPA, Table 1.1.6). And again, the biggest shortfalls remained in residential construction spending. One might have expected the effect of regime uncertainty, or Roosevelt hatred, to have been more apparent, for example, in producer durables spending.
Higgs and Ohanian are, of course, part of a continuing tradition aimed at fixing the responsibility for business cycles on government. That tradition includes Jude Wanniski's 1978 attempt to attribute the Great Depression entirely to the passage of the Smoot-Hawley tariff. The unifying theme in this literature is that depressions are the result of government intervention in the workings of the 'free market' system. There is no doubt that some of the policies discussed did have the potential to generate efficiency losses. But arguments that might make sense if economies always operated at potential often cease to hold in a world where output gaps are a real and continuing problem. In Economics 1, students are taught that there's no such thing as a free lunch, that everything has an opportunity cost, that if you want more guns you have to have less butter. Such pieties simply do not apply when, in a recession, one is operating well within the production possibility frontier.
Thus, in principle, David Ricardo was right: tariffs reduce global welfare and output by impeding the international division of labour. But in a world of slack resources, such damage may be small, and by redirecting purchasing power towards import competing domestic producers, tariffs during recessions may actually have a mildly stimulative effect (Eichengreen and Sachs, 1985) . And whereas the theory of monopoly suggests that the policies of the NRA, which encouraged ca rtelization and wage and price increases, could have reduced output and damaged consumer welfa re, in the presence of defl ation and large scale unem ployment they may have done the reverse, by helping to break the back of deflationary expectations (Eggertsson, 2008) .
Finally, note that while Cole and Ohanian attack th e NRA fo r fostering monopoly, Higgs criticizes the second New Deal for trying aggressively to restrict it. One can either take th e view that the effi ciency losses from monopoly are small, in which case one might conclude that the concerns about the NJRA are misplaced, or one can take the opposite view, which would undercut Higgs' position. But o ne cannot con sistently endorse both Higgs and Ohanian unless one believes th at the fos tering of monopoli es is necessaril y damaging when done by governments but not so when done by priva te enterprise.
T he fac ts of economic performance in the United States between 1929 and 194 1 have not changed, but many of the same issues continue to be relitigated in the literature. M uch of the 'new' focus on negative government-induced supply shocks represents an attempt to refocus attention away from the gap between actual and potential output and towards effici ency losses associated with different kinds of government intervention. In 1977, James Tobin , surveying a related set of arguments concerning economic policy and perform ance in the 1970s, opined that '[ i]t takes a heap of Harberge r triangles to fill an Okun gap' (Tobin , 1977: 468) . Tobin m eant that the welfare losses from tariffs, taxes, and other government regulations were often small compared to those associated with operating an economy below capacity in the case of the Depression fo r mo re than a decade.
CONCLU SIO N
Although our emphasis in understanding the depth and durati on of the Depression will and should continue to be on aggregate demand, more attention to aggregate supply is welcome and overdue. The dominant story here is of a broad array of positive shocks that caused potential, and, as the output gap closed, actual, output to grow rapidly betwee n 1929 and 1941. In contrast, research associated with the real business cycle tradition has emphasized negative shocks resulting fro m deleterious actions by government and unions. These, it is argued, help account fo r the duration of the downturn. Although the Flint sit down strike and other labour disturbances likely played a role in the decline of output and employment during the 1937-38 recession, the influence of labour policy in prolonging the Depression has been exaggerated. Much of what happened rectified in part the unbalanced distribution of gains from productivity growth during the I 920s. The resulting moderation in inequali ty, which became especially apparent after th e war, persisted th ro ugh the I 970s and, as the post-wa r experience suggests, should not have posed an obstacle to full recovery in the late 1930s had there been adequate growth in nominal income. Obstacles on the supply side did play a role, but the impediments to the revi val of residential construction, refl ecting the hangover from the I 920s boom, were more important.
W hat lessons can we draw fo r the twenty first century? Fro m the standpoint of long run growth the most co mpelling question is whether there is necessarily a silver lining to recession in the form of a productivity windfall. It is a question, unfortunately, without a clear answer. Productivity growth was unusually strong across the worst downturn in US experience, but this coincidence was in part an historical accident. Preliminary data indicate modest TFP growth from 2005 or 2007 up through 2010, although labour productivity growth after 2007 has been stronger (see Table 12 .1). These data are, however, subject to revision, and we do not yet know how much of this may reflect cyclical influences. Part of the more robust growth in output per hour is the consequence of a rapid rise in the capitallabour ratio attributable to slow employment growth. As the output gap closes labour productivity growth may experience retardation unless compensated for by strong TFP advance. Even in the event the longer term TFP trajectory turns out to be favourable, it will be difficult to assess whether much or any of it can be attributed to the recession per se.
Considering shorter term supply-side effects, in both instances legacies from the boom retarded recovery, and in both instances construction was implicated. But the mechanisms differed. In post-war housing booms, including the saving and loan boomlet of the late 1980s as well as the more severe cycle of the 2000s, zoning and land use regulation ameliorated the problems of premature subdivision, without, of course, preventing overbuilding. Thus, the physical and some of the legal obstacles to recovery are today less severe than they were during the Depression, a positive contribution of government regulation, albeit at the local level, to macroeconomic stability. This contribution was offset, nevertheless, by the deterioration of effective regulatory efforts in the financial sector, and the financial wreckage from the prior construction boom remains worse in the 2010s than it was in the 1930s, which suffered more from the legacy of a highly leveraged stock market boom (see Field, 2011 Field, : chapter 10, 2013 .
This chapter has focused attention largely on the supply side. As far as aggregate demand is concerned it is fair to say that, in both instances, the cumulative output gap could have been less had more aggressive government action counteracted the persisting shortfalls in nominal income growth resulting from weak private investment spending, as well, to a lesser degree, from cutbacks in household spending on consumer durables. Monetary policy, at least subsequent to 2008, gets better marks in the more recent episode than during the Depression, although fiscal policy stimulus, particularly on the expenditure side, could have been stronger in both instances. The rapid closing of the remaining output gap in 1942 makes this point effectively for the Great Depression. And contrary to political claims that the 2009 stimulus programme (the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act) did not work, its main defect was simply that it was too small. Without it, the unemployment rate would have been as much as two percentage points higher. Table 1 .1.6, accessed 21 February 2012). Because state and local spending was higher in the aggregate than federal spen ding on goods and services (74 per cent higher in 2007.4), these changes were largely although not entirely offsetting. : 1929-1948 This appendix describes the calculations underlying the Table 12 .1 productivity estimates for the US PNE over the intervals 1929-41 and 1941 -48 . The raw materials are series on output, capital, and hours. In calculations in Field (2011) and earlier work, all three of these series are drawn from Kendrick (1961 ) . The updated numbers reported in this chapter are based on newer series for output and capital and show stronger gains in productivity growth for these periods than those reported earlier. The output series is based on the latest chained index estimates from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIP A) tables provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). This series grows more rapidly than that used by Kendrick, and is the principal reason the productivity growth rates reported here are higher. The capital stock series is drawn from the fixed asset portion of the BEA website, and differs slightly from what Kendrick used. The labour hours series is the same as that used by Kendrick in 1961 ; it has not been updated in the half century since he published. The substitution of the newer output and capital series yields an unadjusted PNE TFP growth rate of2.54 per cent per year between 1929 and 1941, which can be compared with an unadjusted 2.31 per cent per year, calculated directly from Table A -XXIII of Kendrick (1961) . With a cyclical adjustment, the newer estimate rises to 2.97 per cent per year, as compared with a cyclically adjusted 2.78 per cent reported earlier (Field, 2011: 43, 100) . Most of the difference between these two sets of growth rates is attributable to the faster growth of the chained index output series.
APPEND IX: PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN THE UNITED ST ATES
Chained indexes try to resolve the fundamentally unresolvable differences between Paasche and Laspeyres quantity indices by taking a geometric average of the growth rates from one year to the next calculated using each type of index, and then creating a linked series. Chained index methods are better for calculating the growth of aggregates over time than the older procedures of sticking with base period prices for a number of years, and then switching to a new base year. The problem with this approach is that every time a new base year is introduced, the calculated growth of aggregates changes, requiring us, in a sense, to rewrite periodically our economic history even though the underlying data are not changing.
Although chained index methods are better for measuring the growth of aggregates over time, they are not as useful for estimating the relative shares of components of the aggregates, since these shares, if calculated using the same procedures, will not necessarily continue to sum to the aggregates year after year. Since measures of TFP growth involve relationships between the growth of aggregates, however, it is appropriate to ask how the use of series not
Without th e stimulus, th e decline in state and local revenue, and thus expenditures, would have been eve n greater, and one wo uld have also lacked the benefits of federal infrastructu ral spending as well as the weaker support for consumption provided by the tax redu ctions includ ed in th e American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and such programmes as 'cash for clunkers'. By 20 I l .4, state and local spending was 46 per cent higher than federal spending (N IPA Tabl e 1. The aggregate used in Table 12 .1 is the PNE, a subset of the national economy excluding agriculture and government. The logic of excluding these two sectors from studies of long term productivity growth is that the value of much of the former (government product) is set at its cost of production, precluding by convention any productivity improvement. And output in the latter sectoragriculture-is often affected by supply shocks (floods, hailstorms, temperature changes) that have little to do with improvements in efficiency. Because of these exclusions, I need to adjust downward the annual levels of real GDP from NIPA Table 1.1.6 so that they correspond roughly to the PNE. Kendrick (1961 : 298-300 , Table A -III) provides annual estimates not only for GDP but also for government and farm product separately. I subtract the latter two subtotals from the former to get estimates of the PNE in 1929 dollars, and use the ratios of the PNE to GDP in the Kendrick data to adjust the BEA NIPA Table 1.1.6 numbers for the entire economy to approximate those for the PNE. According to the chain weighted series, 1941 GDP was 39.8 per cent higher than the comparable 1929 figure (2.79 per cent growth per year). Using the PNE/ GDP ratio from Kendrick as described above to calculate PNE levels for the chained index series, I estimate that real output in the PNE was 37.7 per cent higher in 1941 than in 1929 (2.67 per cent growth per year).
I then go to the BEA Fixed Asset Table 2 .1 for levels of private fixed assets (structures and equipment) during the period 1929-41. Since Kendrick provides estimates of the capital stock for the private domestic economy (1961: 334-7, Table A-XXII; this includes farm output) as well as for the PNE (1961 : 338-40 ,  Table A -XXIII), I use the ratio of the latter to the forme r to adjust the BEA private fixed asset data to get estimates of private non-farm chained index capital. This series grows very slightly rather than, as had been the case with Kendrick's, declining very slightly between 1929 and 1941. Kendrick had PNE capital about 1.6 per cent lower in 1941 than 1929, while the newer BEA series with the adjustment to approximate fixed capital in the PNE shows a small increase (1.5 per cent) over the 12 year period. Substituting the newer capital series for the one used by Kendrick will slightly reduce calculated TFP growth by slightly increasing the growth of the comb ined input measure. In the calculations that follow, however, this effect will be more than swamped by the substantially higher growth in output using chained indexes.
1 then proceed to calculate revised indexes of TFP levels (A) for 1929, 1941 and 1948 . The assumed functional specification of the production function is CobbDouglas, with constant returns to scale:
Using lower case letters to represent continuously compounded growth rates, we have a ve rsion of the fundam ental growth accounting equation. This equation tells us that TFP growth (a) is the difference between output growth (y) and a weighted average of capital (k) and labour (n) growth . a = y -/Jk -(1 -/J) n /3, the elasticity of output with respect to capital, as well as capital's share, is assumed to be 0.25, and that ofl abour, (1 -/3), 0.75. These are the shares Kendrick ass umed fo r 1929-37 (Kendrick, 196 1: 285, . He used an even smaller capital share (0.23) fo r 1937-48, but I am assuming most of the small drop in the share occurred after the start of the wa r, and to keep m atters simple, use 0.25 fo r the entire 1929-4 1 period. As already noted, because the growth of labour and cap ital input both remain close to zero between 1929 and 194 1, changes in these weights will m ake almost no difference in calculated TFP growth rates.
The PNE TFP levels resulting from these calculations show TFP 35.7 per cent higher in 194 1 than in 1929 (2.54 per cent growth per year). Recall that real output in the PNE was 37.7 per cent higher (2.67 per cent growth per yea r). Once again, almost all of the growth in output can be attributed to TFP gro wt h, not growth in inputs conventionally measured. This is not surprising. Since we are using the same series fo r labour hours input as did Kendrick, and the capital input series has received only a slight upward adjustment, combined priva te sector input growth over the 12 yea r period is still very close to zero.
T his estimate of 2.54 per cent per yea r PNE TFP growth is before a cyclical adj ustment. The adjustment is based on a regression of differences in logs of annual levels of TFP (fl.ln (TFP)) on a constant and the change in the unemployment rate in percentage points fo r the period 1929-4 1. The coeffi cient on the constant term (0.0306, or 3.06 per cent per year) provides a ro ugh gauge of the trend growth rate of total facto r productivity across the Depression yea rs. The coefficient on the change in the unemployment rate (-0.0084, or -0.84 percentage points) estimates how much the PNE TFP growth rate tended to decline (rise) if the un employment rate increased (decreased) one percentage point. 22 T he econometric specification assumes that flu ctuations in the unemployment rate (and, implicitly, the output gap) during this period are drive n primarily by fluct uations in aggregate demand; the hypothesis maintained is th at TFP procycl icality is almost entirely a consequence of business cycles, ra ther th an their cause (see th e main body of the chapter). Th e regression results are as fo llows (t statistics in parentheses). One way to cycl ically adj ust would simply be to replace the 2.54 per cent with the 3.06 per cent coeffici ent o n the constant in the above regressio n. I use a related procedure that yields something very close to this. Si nce unemployment in 1941 was still 9.9 per cent, I ask, in light of the cyclicality coefficient, what the level of TFP in 1941 would have been had unemployment in that year been what it was in 1948 (3.8 per cent). Based on the regression results, the natural log of the 1941 level of TFP would have been 0.0512 higher (-6.1 * -0 .0084) had unemployment in 1941 been at the 1948 rate of 3.8 per cent. That also implies that the difference in the log level from any ea rlier year would have been 0.0512 higher. Dividing by 12, this would mean an additional 0.427 percentage points per year added to the continuously compounded growth rate measured from 1929 to 194 1.
23 Thus, with a cyclical adj ustment, the TFP growth rate for the PNE rises from 2.54 per cent per year to 2.97 per cent per year. Th is is the rate reported for 1929-41 in Table 12 .1.
The cyclical adjustment strengthens my argument about the magn itude of a Great Leap Forward between 1929 and 1941. But it is not essential fo r the narrative si nce the dominance of that period stands out even without the adjustment, and, for that matter, even with the somewhat lower unadjusted TFP rate calculated directly from Kendrick. No other period in US economic history exh ibits a comparable ra te of growth of total factor productivity.
W ith the cyclically adj usted level for 1941, we can now also calculate 1941-48 TFP growth, which comes in at 2.08 per cent per year, close to estimates for the golden age (1948-73), higher than that reported in Field (20 11 : 43) , but still almost a third below the estimated rate of growth for 1929-41.
Let us consider now how the use of the chai ned index numbers affects other productivity measures. Using cha ined index output and capital, labour productivity (output per hour in the PNE), grew 38 per cent between 1929 and 1941 (2.68 per cent per yea r) . Output per adjusted hour (adjusted hours take into account possible changes in labour quality) was 35.7 per cent higher (2.54 per cent growth per year). Because Kendrick's implied measure of labour quality grows slightly over the Depression yea rs, output per adj usted hour growth is slightly lower than growth in output per unadjusted (raw) hours.
These growth rates are before a cyclical adjustment. Specifying the appropriate counterfactual here is trickier than with TFP. We know that labour productivity growth is also pro-cyclical, although not as strongly so as is TFP (Field, 2010a) . We also know, from a rearrangement of the fundamental growth accoun ting equation , that labour productivity growth is equal to the sum of TFP growth and cap ital's share times the rate of capital deepening:
This equation tells us that labo ur productivity growth (y-n) is affected by two influences in principle distinct: technological and organization innovation (reflected in the (a) term), and increases in the ratio of physical capital to labour, or capital deepening, reflected in the (k -n) expression. Capital deepening results when an economy allocates part of its annual GDP to produce buildings and equi pment. So long as gross priva te domestic investm ent exceeds depreciation (the an nual wear and tear on the existing stock), the physical capital stock will grow, and when it grows fas ter than labour or labour hours, the ratio of ph ysical capital to labour increases. We say that capital has deepened (k -n is positive) , and on this acco unt alone, output per hour should rise. A road construction crew using heavy construction equipment should, fo r exa mple, be able to move more cubic metres of earth per hour than a crew using pick axes and shovels. The transition fro m d igging wi th shovels to digging wi th backhoes requires capital accu mulation, and its contribution to growth in output per hour is at least conceptually distinct fro m a technological or orga ni zational innovation that adds to a nation's book of available blueprints.
We have already calculated that, with the chained index output and capital numbers, and under a counterfactual in which 1941 unemployment was 3.8 per cen t rather th an the actual 9.9 per cent, the rate of growth of TFP between 1929 and 194 1 wo uld have been 2.97 rather than 2.54 per cent per yea r (0.43 percentage points per yea r higher). Since TFP growth is one of two key in fl uences on labour productivity growth, this cyclical adjustment to TFP, by itself, would contribute a simil ar bump to growth in output per hou r. But we also know that capital tends to 'shallow' in a recovery: the growth of the capital-labou r ratio, and quite possibly its level, decl ine as one app roaches potential outp ut fro m below (in the short run, the denomin ator (labour) grows fas ter than the numerator (capital)) . Capital shallowing weakens labour productivity growth during a recovery, partiall y counterbalancing the positive influence of pro-cyclical TFP. From a growth accoun ting perspective, this counterbalance is the main explanation fo r why labour p roductivity growth is more weakl y pro-cyclical th an TFP growth.
From a regression of the change in the natural log of the capi tal-labo ur ratio on a constan t, and the change in the unemployment rate over the entire 1890-2004 period, we can esti mate the cyclicality coefficient for the capital-labour ratio at 0.0 151: ro ughly speaking, KIN declines by 1.5 per cent fo r each one percentage point decline in the un employment rate (Field, 20 Summing the effect of the hypothetically higher TFP growth rate (0.43 percentage points per year) and the effect of the hypotheticall y lower (negative) growth rate of the capital-labour ra ti o (-0.19 percentage points per year), we concl ude that the appropri ate cyclical adjustment for the labour p roductivity growth rate between 1929 and 1941 is 0.24 percentage points per yea r (0.43 -0. 19). Adding thi s to our in itial estimate of the growth of (actual) output per adj usted labour hour, we reach a cyclically adjusted rate of growth of output per hour of 2.92 per cent per year. Using the hours series that has been adjusted for improvements in labour quality we get, using the new output series, a cyclically adjusted rate of growth of 2.78 per cent. This is a striking result, since it tells us that the growth of output per hour between 1929 and 1941 was at least as high as it was across the quarter century generally viewed as the golden age of US living standard improvements . It is important contextually in understanding the discussion in the second part of this chapter about the growth of real wages during the Depression.
Finally, let us consider how the introduction of these two new series affects calculations of capital productivity (output per unit of capital). Using the new capital and output series, adjusted as described to correspond with the PNE, we have output per unit of capital rising 35.6 per cent between 1929 and 1941 (2.54 per cent per year). This is once again before a cyclical adjustment. We know that capital productivity is very strongly pro-cyclical (and indeed it is this procyclicality, even more than the weaker pro-cyclicality of labour productivity, that in an accounting sense, drives TFP's strong pro-cyclicality). The regression below, for the period 1890-2004, shows that, while there is no long term trend in capital productivity (the constant term is approximately 0, confirming one of Nicholas Kaldor's stylized facts about economic growth), a one percentage point decline in the unemployment rate typically adds about 2 per cent to that year's growth in output per unit of capital (Field, 2010a) . This pro-cyclicality is because, when an economy comes out of a recession, output grows much faster than physical capital. Since the counterfactual we have been exploring involves 1941 unemployment at 1948 levels (3.8 per cent), which is a 6.1 percentage point difference from actual, this suggests that had 1941 been at or close to potential, the natural log of 1941 capital productivity would have been 0.122 higher that year. Dividing by 12, that would have added 1.01 percentage points to the continuously compounded growth rate of capital productivity between 1929 and 1941, yielding a cyclically adjusted rate of growth of 3.56 per cent per year. A check on the reasonableness of this calculation can be made through another rearrangement of the fundamental growth accounting equation, which tells us that TFP growth must be equal to a weighted average of capital productivity and labour productivity growth. (To persuade yourself of this, multiply out, eliminate the (3y terms which cancel out, and rearrange the remaining terms).
24 l am approximating th e service fl ow from the capital stock by assuming th at it is proport ional to the stock. For mechanical machinery, depreciati on ca n be affected by ho urs of operation or start-stop cycl es. But mechani cal machin ery is a small fraction of the fi xed asset stock, th e bulk of which co nsists of structures. For th e ca nonical physical capital good-a building-the rate at which a roof wears out, or exteri or paint oxidizes, is almost entirely independent of how full or empty it is, or how rapidl y goods and peopl e move through it. For furth er discussio n of th is approximation, see Field, 201 0a,c. a = [3(y -k) + (1 -{J ) (y -n) Noting that the relevant labour input series in both Kendrick's and my revised calculation is adjusted hours (adjusted for labour quality growth), we can deduce an implied rate of capital productivity advance (y -k) consistent with our estimates of TFP and labour productivity advance. Since we have already calculated cyclically adjusted estimates for a and y -n, these numbers are easily backed out. For the 1929-41 period, this comes in at 3.54 per cent per year, very close to what we arrive at using the cyclicality coefficient from the 1890-2004 regression.
Output, both actual and potential, grew substantially between 1929 and 1941 with only minimal increases in private sector physical capital, which is to say that the capital to output ratio declined, since the output to capital ratio rose. There are other periods in US economic history in which labour productivity grew as rapidly as during the Great Depression. There is none in which this was true for capital productivity. The uniqueness of this development is brought into strong relief when we remind ourselves that there is no long run upward trend for capital productivity.
Making an upward adjustment to the 1941 level of the output to capital ratio will of course raise the 1929-41 growth rates, and reduce the growth rate for 1941 -48. In this case, the cyclical adjustment lowers capital productivity growth between 1941 and 1948 from 3.07 per cent per year ( using the unadjusted level of capital productivity in 1941) to 1.34 per cent ( using the adjusted level). As a check, the calculation using the formula above relating TFP growth, labour productivity growth, and capital productivity growth comes in at 1.36 per cent.
As already discussed in describing the cyclical adjustment for 1941 labour productivity, a cyclically adjusted level for the 1941 capital -labour ratio is based on a regression of the log difference of the capital-labour ratio on a constant and the change in the unemployment rate in percentage points. The regression shows that the capital-labour ratio has risen over the long run at about 1.6 per cent per year, but there has also been strong cyclical variation. In particular, as an economy recovers, labour input grows much more rapidly than capital input so the capitallabour ratio falls. Without a cyclical adjustment, the capital-labour ratio in the PNE rises very slightly (0.14 per cent per year) between 1929 and 1941. We have already calculated that had the 1941 unemployment rate been 3.8 per cent, the natural log of the 1941 capital-labour ratio would have been 0.092 lower, which would have reduced the annual growth rate of the ratio by 0.77 percentage points per year, yielding a cyclically adjusted growth rate of -0.63 per cent per year. With a cyclical adjustment, the ratio then grows at a rate of 1.28 per cent per year between 1941 and 1948. We can check on the reasonableness of these calculations by observing that the difference between the rate of labour productivity growth and capital productivity growth should yield the rate of capital deepening: y -n -(y -k) = k -n To summarize, the pivotal number in all of these calculations is the TFP growth rate for the PNE. Using output, hours, and capital input from Kendrick (1961) , TFP growth is 2.31 per cent per year, continuously compounded (with a cyclical adjustment: 2.78 per cent per year). Using the same hours series, but the newer chain weighted output series and the chain weighted capital stock series, we get 2.54 per cent per yea r. A cycl ical adjustment raises this to 2.97 per cent per yea r. These cyclicall y adjusted growth ra tes approximate, using the di ffe rent data series as described, what TFP growth between I 929 and 194 1 would have looked like had there been no remaining output gap in 1941. A TFP growth rate approac hing 3 per cent per yea r is unmatched in any comparable period o f US eco nomic growth, and can be decomposed into a ra te oflabour productivity growth equal to or exceeding that reali zed during the golden age, combined with a rate of capital prod uctivity growth fa r exceed ing that in any other period .
Several concerns might be raised about the conclusion , to borrow from the title of my 2003 American Economic Review article, that the 1930s we re indeed 'the most technologically p rogressive decade of th e centu ry'. First, could some of the high rate of TFP growth be due to the ramp up in military spendin g prior to US entry into the wa r in December of I 94 1? O nl y in the sense that, as noted, TFP growth d isplays strong pro-cyclicali ty, and increased military spending p rior to the wa r accelerated the closing of the output gap th rough traditional aggregate de mand mechanisms. Thus the ac tual growth rate of TFP between 1940 and 194 1 is affec ted by the narrowing o f the output gap associ ated with wa r preparations. But what is relevant here is not the growth in TFP from 1940 to 194 1, but ra th er the growth as measured fro m 1929 to 194 1, preferably adjusted to acco unt for the cyclicality of T FP.
Still , is it possible that the military build-up prior to Pearl Harbor not only helped close the output gap, but also augmented potential output? O ne m ust keep in mind the relati ve magnitude of what happened before the US entered the wa r. It is true th at military manpower and spendin g, including Lend Lease, grew dramaticall y from 1939 to 194 1. For example, men in uniform almost tri pled, fro m 600,000 to 1.8 million. But this is dwa rfed by maximum military manpower in 1944 of over 12 million . The US was effectively demilitari zed du ring th e 1930s, and military disbursements to the end of 1941 were less than 5 per cent of what would be expended cumulatively between 1939 and 1945 (Fi eld, 2003 . The U nited States was not full y mobili zed for war until sometime in mid -1942. Given these timelines, there is far too littl e opportunity fo r cumulative output and learning by doing in wa r-related p roduction to have generated technological and orga nizational spillovers with enduring impact on the economy's potential output (Field, 2011: chapter 3) . Thus, it is unlikely that the measure of the TFP trend growth rate betwee n 1929 and 194 1 is influenced by the military build -up.
A second concern is whether or to what degree TFP growth might be based on improvements in human capital or labour quality. As can be seen from the second column of Table 12 . 1, which shows the growth of adjusted labour p roductivity, the overall growth of labour quality was modest during the Depression years, and thus the numbers fo r output per hour and output per adjusted hour growth are qui te similar. Human capital mattered , but the contributions o f the rather small number (in comparison with the total labour fo rce) of wo rkers in R&D labs was probably more important than any general upwa rd trend in the quali ty of labou r. And whatever the position one takes on the empirical relevance of selective retention of higher quali ty labour in economic downturns (Margo, 199 1) , this is sim ply not relevant fo r compari so ns betwee n the years 1929 and 194 1. Although p rivate sector hours were effectively unchanged, because of a reduction in hours per person, there were actually 11 per cent more persons employed in the latter year than in 1929 than in (Kendrick, 1961 . Any effect of selective retention that might have been in play between 1929 and 1933 would have been more than reversed by the rapid growth of the economy and the increase in persons employed between 1933 and 1937 and again between 1938 and 1941. A third concern involves the extent to which these calculations overlook the influence of public sector infrastructural investments. Are we, for example, simply seeing a statistical artefact, the effect of the substitution of publicly owned street and highway capital for privately owned railway capital? Including economically relevant public capital, which, unlike private sector capital, did grow over the Depression, will, of course, reduce the calculated TFP growth rate, because combined input growth will be positive and higher. Recalculating TFP growth rates for the last three-quarters of the twentieth century using an augmented capital input series that includes economically relevant public sector capital does, as expected, show the Depression years with TFP growth rates that are lower than those calculated using private sector capital alone. But this dynamic affects other periods as well, and 1929-41 still stands out as exhibiting significantly higher TFP growth than the 1920s or any of the post-war periods (Field, 2003 (Field, , 2011 .
